Is There an Health Establishment-Size Premium?

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Results

Conclusion O

Appendix 000

The Employer's Size Wage Premium

• Large literature on the employer's size wage premium.



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- Is there also an employer's size *health* premium?

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- Large literature on the employer's size wage premium.
- Is there also an employer's size *health* premium?
- The employer's size wage premium remains unexplained (Troske 1999).
- Maybe workers at larger firms are healthier and hence are more productive.
- Or maybe but they trade higher wages for *lower* health.

Empirical Model	Results	Conclusion	Appendix
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Intro

• Unhealthy workers have a higher chance of injury (Galizzi and Tempesti 2015)

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• Injury rate is higher at medium sized firms (Leigh 1989).

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- Do unhealthy workers tend to work at medium size firms?

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- Injury rate is higher at medium sized firms (Leigh 1989).
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- Larger employers more likely to offer health insurance benefits.

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- Unhealthy workers have a higher chance of injury (Galizzi and Tempesti 2015)
- Injury rate is higher at medium sized firms (Leigh 1989).
- Do unhealthy workers tend to work at medium size firms?
- Larger employers more likely to offer health insurance benefits.
- Do they have healthier workers and, therefore, lower insurance premia?

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Trade and Health

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- Trade liberalization reallocates market shares from smaller, less productive firms, to larger and more productive firms.
- New variants of Melitz's model also allow for firm size-wage premium.
- The source of the premium relevant for gains from trade.
- Trade and health: Trade liberalization increases injury rate at smaller firms (McManus and Schaur 2015).

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Empirical Model

• Linear probability model:

$$h = \beta_0 + \beta_1 size + \beta_2 X + \epsilon$$

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• where *h* is a dummy which measures good health, *size* are establishment size dummies.

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- where *h* is a dummy which measures good health, *size* are establishment size dummies.
- X_i is a vector of individual controls.



• Source: National Health Institute Survey (NHIS).





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- Source: National Health Institute Survey (NHIS).
- Pooled cross-sections for 1997-2014.
- Extensive health information.
- Adult Sample also contains work-related questions such as establishment-size.

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Measures of Health

• I use four dummy variables.

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Measures of Health

- I use four dummy variables.
- Excellent or very good self-rated health status.

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• Good mental health, i.e. low psychological distress (Kessler score lower than 10).

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Measures of Health

- I use four dummy variables.
- Excellent or very good self-rated health status.
- No functional limitation, e.g. difficulty pushing or pulling large objects.
- Good mental health, i.e. low psychological distress (Kessler score lower than 10).
- No previous health condition equals 1 if never diagnosed with at least one of the following: asthma, cancer, coronary heart, disease, diabetes, heart attack, heart condition/disease, hypertension, stroke, ulcer.

Empirical Mode

Results

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Table: Good Health Status

	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se
1 to 9 employees	-0.02***	-0.02***	0.00	0.00	0.02***
10 to 24 employees	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.00	0.00	0.01**
25 to 49 employees	-0.01**	-0.02***	0.00	0.00	0.01**
50 to 99 employees	-0.02***	-0.02***	0.00	0.00	0.01*
100 to 249 employees	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.01	-0.00	0.00
250 to 499 employees	-0.01**	-0.01**	-0.00	0.00	0.01
500 to 999 employees	-0.02**	-0.02**	-0.01	-0.01	-0.00
1000+ employees	Omitted	Omitted	Omitted	Omitted	Omitted
Age		-0.01***	-0.01***	-0.01***	-0.01***
Black		-0.08***	-0.06***	-0.05***	-0.05***
Other		-0.04***	-0.05***	-0.05***	-0.05***
White		Omitted	Omitted	Omitted	Omitted
Hispanic		-0.09***	-0.04***	-0.03***	-0.03***
Male		0.04***	0.03***	0.03***	0.02***
Born Outside U.S.		0.01	0.01	0.01***	0.02***
Married		0.05***	0.04***	0.03***	0.03***
Number of persons in family		-0.01***	-0.00***	-0.00**	-0.00***
High-School Dropout			Omitted	Omitted	Omitted
High-School			0.10***	0.09***	0.08***
Some College			0.15***	0.14***	0.12***
College			0.24***	0.21***	0.19***
More than College			0.28***	0.25***	0.21***
Years on Current Job				0.00***	0.00***
Weekly Hours				-0.00	-0.00***
Yearly earnings (2014k)					0.00***
Observations (subsample)	168534	168534	168534	168534	168534
R-squared	0.01	0.04	0.06	0.07	0.07

Industry, year and region dummies always included.

Empirical Model	Results	Conclusion	Appendi
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• Positive size-health premium disappears after controlling for education.

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- Positive size-health premium disappears after controlling for education.
- Premium turns negative when controlling for previous year's earnings.

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Empirical Model	Results	Conclusion	Append
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- Positive size-health premium disappears after controlling for education.
- Premium turns negative when controlling for previous year's earnings.

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• No robust evidence of a positive size-health premium.

Empirical Model	Results	Conclusion	
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- Positive size-health premium disappears after controlling for education.
- Premium turns negative when controlling for previous year's earnings.
- No robust evidence of a positive size-health premium.
- Same result for no functional limitation and good mental health dummies.

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Results

Table: No Previous Health Condition

	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se
1 to 9 employees	0.02***	0.01**	0.02***	0.02***	0.02***
	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)
10 to 24 employees	0.03***	0.01***	0.02***	0.02***	0.03***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
25 to 49 employees	0.02***	0.01**	0.02***	0.02***	0.02***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
50 to 99 employees	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
100 to 249 employees	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.01*	0.01**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
250 to 499 employees	-0.01	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
500 to 999 employees	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
1000+ employees	Omitted	Omitted	Omitted	Omitted	Omitted
Demographics		Y	Y	Y	Y
High-School Dropout			Omitted	Omitted	Omitted
High-School			0.02***	0.02***	0.01**
			(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Some College			-0.00	0.00	-0.01
			(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
College			0.05***	0.06***	0.04***
			(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
More than College			0.07***	0.08***	0.06***
			(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Years on Current Job				0.00***	0.00
				(0.00)	(0.00)
Weekly Hours				-0.00***	-0.00***
				(0.00)	(0.00)
Yearly earnings (2014k)					0.00***
					(0.00)
Observations (subsample)	168534	168534	168534	168534	168534
R-squared	0.01	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.08
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Industry, year and region dummies always included.





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No Previous Condition Results

• Size-health premium is always *negative* for all specifications.

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No Previous Condition Results

- Size-health premium is always *negative* for all specifications.
- Smaller establishment have healthier new hires.

Results

Conclusion O

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No Previous Condition Results

- Size-health premium is always *negative* for all specifications.
- Smaller establishment have healthier new hires.
- Size-health premium is especially negative for longer tenure workers.

Intro	Empirical Model	Results	Conclusion	Appendix
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	Con	clusion		

• No evidence of a positive establishment size-health premium.

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• No evidence of a positive establishment size-health premium.

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• The premium is actually negative for no previous health conditions.



• No evidence of a positive establishment size-health premium.

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- The premium is actually negative for no previous health conditions.
- Next steps:



- No evidence of a positive establishment size-health premium.
- The premium is actually negative for no previous health conditions.
- Next steps:
 - Study the relationship between establishment size and work-related injury while controlling for controlling for worker's health.

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- No evidence of a positive establishment size-health premium.
- The premium is actually negative for no previous health conditions.
- Next steps:
 - Study the relationship between establishment size and work-related injury while controlling for controlling for worker's health.

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• Study the establishment size-health insurance benefits premium while controlling for worker's health.

Results

Conclusion

Appendix •00

Table: Summary Statistics

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.
Good Self-Reported Health	0.71	0.45
Has No Condition	0.66	0.47
No Functional Limitations	0.81	0.39
Good Mental Health	0.96	0.2
1 to 9 employees	0.17	0.38
10 to 24 employees	0.15	0.35
25 to 49 employees	0.11	0.32
50 to 99 employees	0.1	0.3
100 to 249 employees	0.13	0.33
250 to 499 employees	0.08	0.26
500 to 999 employees	0.06	0.23
1000+ employees	0.21	0.4
Age	39.52	11.44
White	0.79	0.41
Black	0.14	0.34
Non-white and non-black	0.08	0.26
Hispanic	0.19	0.39
Male	0.55	0.5
Born Outside U.S.	0.2	0.4
Married	0.48	0.5
Number of persons in family	2.57	1.49
High-School Dropout	0.11	0.31
High-School	0.3	0.46
Some College	0.31	0.46
College	0.2	0.4
More than College	0.08	0.27
Years on Current Job	6.94	7.83
Weekly Hours	44.66	8.88
Yearly earnings (2014k)	34.12	30.34
Ν	1	68534

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Table: Good Health Status

	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se
1 to 9 employees	-0.02***	-0.02***	0.00	0.00	0.02***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)
10 to 24 employees	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.00	0.00	0.01**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
25 to 49 employees	-0.01**	.0 02***	0.00	0.00	0.01**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
50 to 99 employeer	.0.02***	.0.02***	0.00	0.00	0.01*
so to ss anpioyeta	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
100 to 249 amplourer	-0.02***	.0.02***	-0.01	-0.00	0.00
100 to 245 cmployees	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
050 . 400	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
200 to 499 employees	-0.01	-0.01	-0.00	(0.00)	(0.01)
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
500 to 999 employees	-0.02**	-0.02**	-0.01	-0.01	-0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
1000+ employees	Omitted	Omitted	Omitted	Omitted	Omitted
Age		-0.01***	-0.01***	-0.01***	-0.01***
		(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Black		-0.08***	-0.06***	-0.05***	-0.05***
		(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Other		-0.04***	-0.05***	-0.05***	-0.05***
		(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
White		Omitted	Omitted	Omitted	Omitted
Hispanic		-0.09***	-0.04***	-0.03***	-0.03***
		(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Male		0.04***	0.03***	0.03***	0.02***
ittain.		(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Rese Outside U.S.		(0.00)	(0.00)	0.01***	0.00888
bom odtade 0.5.		(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
		(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Married		0.05	0.04	0.03****	0.03****
		(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Number of persons in family		-0.01***	-0.00***	-0.00**	-0.00***
		(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
High-School			0.10***	0.09***	0.08***
			(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Some College			0.15***	0.14***	0.12***
			(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
College			0.24***	0.21***	0.19***
			(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
More than College			0.28***	0.25***	0.21***
-			(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
High-School Dropout			Omitted	Omitted	Omitted
Years on Current Job				0.00***	0.00***
				(0.00)	(0.00)
Weekly Hours				-0.00	-0.00***
Weekly Hours				(0.00)	(0.00)
Yearly earnings (2014k)				(0.00)	0.00***
(2014K)					(0.00)
Observations (subservate)	160524	160524	160524	169524	169524
Observations (subsample)	100534	100534	100534	100534	100534
Observations (pop.n)	1/10059	1/10059	1/10059	1/10059	1/10059
rc-squared	0.01	0.04	0.06	0.07	0.07
Industry year and region dummies	abarans include	irl.			

lustry, year and region dummies always included.

Results 000000 Appendix 000

Table: No Previous Health Condition

1. 0. 1	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se
1 to 9 employees	(0.02****	(0.00)	(0.02	(0.02	(0.01)
10 . 04	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)
10 to 24 employees	(0.03	(0.01)	(0.02	(0.01)	(0.01)
25 . 40	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
25 to 49 employees	(0.02****	(0.01)	(0.02	(0.01)	(0.01)
50 . 00	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
50 to 99 employees	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
100 - 040 - 1	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
100 to 249 employees	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
252 . 402	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
250 to 499 employees	-0.01	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	(0.00)
500 - 000 -	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
500 to 999 employees	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
1000 :	(0.01) Omitted	(0.01) Omitted	(0.01) Omitted	(0.01) Omitted	(0.01) Omitted
1000+ employees	Omitted	Omitted	Omitted	Omitted	Omitted
Age		-0.01++++	-0.01++++	-0.01++++	-0.01++++
D 1 1		(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Black		-0.03-+++	-0.02++++	-0.02++++	-0.02++++
Other		0.01**	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Other		(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
14.00		(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
white		Omitted	Omitted	Omitted	Omitted
Hispanic		(0.02	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
		(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Male		(0.00)	(0.00)	0.00	+0.00
Rese Outside U.S.		(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Born Outside 0.5.		(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
		(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Married		(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.00)
N 1 6 7 6 7		(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Number of persons in family		(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Mich School		(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
rigii-sciooi			(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Earna Callana			0.00	0.00	0.01
Some Conege			(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)
Cellerer			0.05***	0.05***	0.04***
College			(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Mass then College			0.07***	0.001	0.05***
wore than conege			(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
High-School Dropout			Omitted	Omitted	Omitted
Years on Current Job			Omitted	0.00***	0.00
Tears on Current 500				(0.00)	(0.00)
Weekly Hours				-0.00***	.0.00***
Treeny riours				(0.00)	(0.00)
Yearly earnings (2014k)				(0.00)	0.00***
					(0.00)
Observations (subsample)	168534	168534	168534	168534	168534
Observations (non n)	1710059	1710059	1710059	1710059	1710059
Risquared	0.01	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.08
Industry year and region dominist	abuses includ		2.00	2.00	2.00
musely, year and region dumining analysis mounted.					